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Abstract 
This paper compares the accuracy of the Consensus forecasts for euro-area GDP growth, 
consumer and producer price inflation, and the USD/EUR exchange rate to those of 
the European Commission, International Monetary Fund, and Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, and also to the naive forecast and the forecast 
implied by the forward exchange rate. In the period from 1994 to 2009 the Consensus 
forecasts for effective euro-area consumer price inflation and GDP growth beat the alter-
natives by a difference which is typically statistically significant. The results are more 
diverse for the pre-crisis sample (1994–2007). The Consensus forecast for euro-area 
producer price inflation significantly outperforms the naive forecast in the short term. 
Finally, the Consensus forecast for the USD/EUR exchange rate during the period from 
2002 to 2009 is more precise than the naive forecast and the forecast implied by the for-
ward rate. 
1. Introduction 
The monetary policy regime of direct inflation targeting was adopted by 
the Czech National Bank (CNB) in 1998. Under inflation targeting, the forecast for 
consumer price inflation (CPI) at the monetary policy horizon is of great relevance to 
the decision-making on current interest rates. An important assumption of the CNB’s 
macroeconomic forecast is the external economic outlook, which is partly derived 
from the Consensus Forecasts (hereinafter “Consensus”). 
Consensus is a regular monthly survey publication which provides forecasts 
and views on the principal macroeconomic indicators, including GDP growth, price 
inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates, in over 85 countries. The surveys mainly 
contain the expectations of the main investment banks and other well-known ana-
lytical centers. Consensus serves as a background for the decision-making processes 
of economic agents, including central banks. It is therefore relevant to research the ex- 
-post accuracy of Consensus, because if we are aware of the historical performance 
of the Consensus forecasts we are then in a better position to judge the information it 
provides for our future decision-making. 
In this paper, we decided to compare the forecasting accuracy of Consensus 
with the corresponding forecasts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and European Com-
mission (EC), and also with the naive forecast and forecasts implied by the forward 
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courek for his technical assistance. Nevertheless, all errors and omissions are ours. The views expressed
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exchange rate. The forecasts of real GDP growth, CPI inflation, and PPI inflation for 
Austria, France, Germany, and Italy are assessed along with the nominal USD/EUR 
exchange rate forecasts. Contrary to the available literature, we assess the forecasts 
for each macroeconomic variable in terms of the effective indicator, where each coun- 
try forecast is weighted by the  respective country share in Czech exports. The  same 
effective indicators are applied in the CNB’s prediction process. 
Our main focus is on the Consensus performance in the period from 1994 to 
2009, but we also separately assess the pre-crisis period from 1994 to 2007 to reveal 
any potential impacts which the financial crisis might have imposed on the overall 
forecasting accuracy. In addition, we assess the accuracy of the forecasts for a shorter 
period starting in 2002. Standard descriptive statistics of the accuracy of the forecasts 
as well as statistical tests for significance in the forecasting errors are applied. 
Because of the rather long history and wide acceptance of Consensus, there 
are a vast number of publications dealing with its accuracy. Similarly to our paper, 
Batchelor (2001, 2007) compares the  Consensus forecasts with the  corresponding 
forecasts published by the IMF and OECD. According to him, the Consensus forecasts 
are less biased and more accurate for the G7 countries. The GDP growth forecasts 
have been overestimated (higher than actual values) in the cases of France, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan. Conversely, the CPI inflation forecasts have been unbiased. Similar-
ly, Osterloh (2008), who dealt solely with the Consensus forecasts for German real 
GDP growth in the period from 1995 to 2005, shows that forecasters pooled by Con-
sensus were systematically overestimating the growth rates. In addition, he discovers 
a relatively low accuracy for next-year forecasts compared to a simple naive forecast. 
The Consensus forecasts for 12 industrial countries over the period from 1996 to 
2006 were also explored regarding their bias and information efficiency in Ager et al. 
(2009). The authors showed that the forecasts for some countries, e.g., for Germany 
and Italy, and in particular the forecasts for horizons longer than one year, were sys-
tematically biased. Moreover, forecast information efficiency had to be rejected in 
almost all cases. 
Among others, Timmermann (2006) analyzed the IMF forecasts in compari-
son with Consensus. He finds the IMF forecasts similar to those of Consensus and 
identifies weaknesses in the IMF forecasts. Bowle et al. (2007) assess the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF) in the period from 1999 to 2006. The SPF surveys 
approximately 75 forecasters from the European Union and asks them for their short 
and long-term expectations about euro-area economic variables – inflation, GDP 
growth, and unemployment. Bowle et al. (2007) conclude that the SPF provides bet-
ter forecasts for the GDP growth of the euro area in comparison with Consensus. 
Nevertheless, their results are not surprising given that the SPF focuses solely on 
the euro area and has the advantage of a larger sample of respondents (some of whom 
contribute to Consensus as well). 
A different approach was applied by Dovern et al. (2009). Contrary to the pre-
vious literature on the topic, the authors did not concentrate on the mean Consensus, 
but analyzed the dispersion (heterogeneity) of individual Consensus forecasters. They 
found that disagreement among forecasters tends to rise during recessions and is 
particularly pronounced in the  case of real variables (GDP growth, consumption 
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ward trend in the disagreement of the forecasts for nominal variables (CPI inflation 
and interest rates) and this is lower in the  case of countries with an  independent 
central bank (for 35 percent).
1 It is also mentioned that Consensus is sensitive to 
current conditions, due to a strong correlation of the one-year-ahead forecasts with 
the current actual values. 
More generally, Ang et al. (2007) compared four different methods of infla-
tion forecasting and they assert that survey forecasts (the Livingston, Michigan, and 
SPF surveys) outperform the other three methods, namely, the ARIMA model, the eco-
nomic model of the Phillips curve, and the term structure of interest rates. 
With respect to the Czech National Bank’s own inflation forecasts, Antal et al. 
(2008) analyzed the bias of the forecasts in relation to any undershooting of the in-
flation target. In addition, Babecký and Podpiera (2011) compared the accuracy of 
the CNB’s inflation forecasts with other financial institutions’ forecasts for the Czech 
Republic. 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the basic charac-
teristics of Consensus and deals with the data and methodology description. Section 3 
covers the empirical results for three macroeconomic variables: CPI inflation, PPI 
inflation, and real GDP growth. Section 4 proceeds with the results for the USD/EUR 
exchange rate, and Section 5 summarizes the main findings. 
2. Data and Methodology 
Consensus is a regular monthly publication of the London-based Consensus 
Economics, which was founded in 1989. Consensus Economics pools more than 
700 economic analysts and economic research centers, mostly from private invest-
ment banks. The number of participating analytical centers varies across individual 
countries and also for different time periods for a given country. It oscillates mostly 
between 10 and 30 analytical centers for a certain economic variable and country. 
The final Consensus forecast for a given country and a certain economic vari-
able is a simple average of the forecasts provided by each participating forecaster. 
The general advantage of the mean forecast is that it eliminates (to a certain degree) 
any possible systematic errors in individual forecasts. 
The Consensus forecasts for selected external economic variables started to be 
used at the Czech National Bank in the second half of 2002. This was connected with 
the  introduction of the  bank’s unconditional quarterly projection model (QPM) of 
the Czech economy, which was replaced by the new dynamic structural model (g3) 
in 2008, and with the resulting need for a consistent forecast of external (foreign) 
economic variables. 
The bank’s external economic outlooks use only a limited number of the eco-
nomic variables which are provided by Consensus. Moreover, the original Consensus 
forecasts are adjusted to make them appropriate for the bank’s prediction process. 
Specifically, the forecasts for CPI and PPI inflation and GDP growth, which are 
available as whole-year percentage changes, are equally decomposed into individual 
quarters in order to make them suitable for the  quarterly model. Subsequently, 
1 Countries with an independent central bank during the whole period under review (1989–2006) comprise 
Canada, France, Germany, and the United States. Countries which did not have an independent central 
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the effective euro-area indicator is calculated by weighting each euro-area country by 
its share in total Czech exports. 
The effective euro-area indicator for the Czech Republic comprises 14 euro- 
-area countries, with only Luxemburg and Malta not being included. Germany (47 per-
cent), Slovakia (14 percent), and France (8 percent) are characterized by having the larg-
est shares in the effective indicator. 
The adjustment procedure is easier in the  case of the  USD/EUR exchange 
rate, where the Consensus point forecasts (rolling-event forecast) three months and 
one year ahead are interpolated. 
In parallel with Consensus the remaining external economic outlooks for 
the oil price, gasoline price, and three-month Euribor are derived from market instru-
ments (derivatives). The market implied outlooks are prepared as of the Consensus 
survey date, i.e., on the second Monday of each calendar month, in order to preserve 
the  time consistency of all the  predicted variables. Finally, the  outlooks for each 
variable are put together. 
The forecasting accuracy of the Consensus forecasts for real GDP growth and 
CPI inflation is compared with corresponding forecasts published by international 
institutions – the EC, the IMF, and the OECD. In addition, the Consensus forecasts 
are assessed against the naive forecasts. The forecasts for PPI inflation and the USD/ 
/EUR exchange rate are assessed, due to a  lack of alternative forecasts, against 
the naive forecast only; moreover, the forecast for USD/EUR is assessed also against 
the forecast derived from the forward exchange rate. The forecast horizon for CPI 
and PPI inflation and real GDP growth is the current year and the  next year. 
The forecast for the USD/EUR exchange rate is available at three-month, one-year, 
and two-year horizons. 
Our naive forecast is a random walk, AR(1) process, with the coefficient 1. 
The naive forecast is thus the last-year growth rate of GDP, CPI inflation, and PPI 
inflation, which is simply prolonged to the current year and the next year. We pro-
ceed similarly with the naive forecast for the USD/EUR exchange rate. The actual 
value of the exchange rate as of the Consensus survey date is used as a constant naive 
forecast at the  three-month, one-year, and two-year horizons.
  The naive  forecasts 
used in the  paper simulate the  behavior of a  naive forecaster who mechanically 
projects (without any additional judgment) the  last available data into the  future. 
Alternatively, ARIMA forecasts, which are another commonly used benchmark 
based on past values, would probably provide better forecasts. We therefore deem 
our benchmark as having the worst available expectation about the future, which is 
our objective. 
We encountered the problem of different publication dates of the compared 
forecasts. The main difference between Consensus and the international institutions’ 
forecasts was the frequency at which the forecasts are published. The advantage of 
Consensus is its monthly frequency, while the EC, IMF, and OECD publish their 
standard forecasts twice a year. The EC and the OECD publish their forecasts every 
May and November, whereas the IMF forecasts are published one month ahead, i.e., 
in April and October. Nevertheless, in 2007 the international institutions started to 
publish interim forecasts as well and the forecasting frequency thus doubled. 
In order to provide an evaluation of the Consensus and international institu-
tions’ forecasts, only the Consensus issues corresponding to the month of the inter-352                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4 
national institutions forecasts’ releases were used for relative forecast assessment. 
Accordingly, the  IMF forecasts were compared with the  April and October Con-
sensus issues, and the EC and OECD forecasts with the May and November Con-
sensus issues. 
In addition, the real GDP growth and CPI and PPI inflation forecasts were 
assessed in terms of the effective indicator and not as a single forecast for a given 
country. This approach reflects the  procedure used by the  CNB whereby external 
economic developments are proxied by effective indicators where each country vari-
able is weighted by the country share in total Czech exports. The comparable effec-
tive Consensus, EC, IMF, and OECD forecasts are constructed before the forecasts 
are evaluated. 
The effective indicator forecast can be expressed as follows: 








=∑                                                       (1) 
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h f is the effective indicator forecast at horizon h (h = 1 for the current year 
and h = 2 for the next year), 
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h f is a particular country forecast at horizon h, and  i w is 
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Only Austria, France, Germany, and Italy are covered in our effective indi-
cator. These four countries are used because previous forecasts are not available for 
every euro-area country. Nevertheless, this is a sufficient approximation given that 
Austria, France, Germany, and Italy account for approximately 70 percent of total 
Czech exports. 
The weight of Germany in our restricted effective indicator is 67 percent. 
France is weighted by 12 percent, and Italy and Austria by 11 and 10 percent, respec-
tively. We calculate both the effective actual time series of real GDP growth and CPI 
and PPI inflation, and also their corresponding effective forecasts for each institution, 
including the naive forecasts. 
The forecasts are assessed for the period from 1994 to 2009, with forecast ac-
curacy also being assessed for the shorter period from 2002 to 2009. The motivation 
for the shorter period is that Consensus was implemented at the CNB in 2002. 
The forecast for the USD/EUR exchange rate is assessed for the periods from 1999 to 
2009 and from 2002 to 2009. In addition, the forecasts are assessed separately in 
the  pre-crisis period (excluding 2008 and 2009) to reveal the  potential effects of 
the financial crisis on overall forecasting accuracy (see the Appendix – available on 
the web-page of this journal: http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz). 
In order to assess forecasting accuracy, the forecasting errors are calculated 
first: 
                                                            ttt eaf = −                                                        (2) 
where  t a  represents the actual (realized) value and  t f  is its corresponding forecast 
value. Similarly to Batchelor (2001) and Osterloh (2008), we use unrevised actual 
values by taking the actual value of the previous year from the current year Con-
sensus June issue. The  actual value of GDP growth in 1994 is thus taken from 
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Unrevised actual data is used because economic forecasters are assumed to be 
quite unlikely to anticipate the extent of data revisions. It is more likely that fore-
casters will make their forecasts anticipating the same methods of data construction 
as those used by governmental statistical agencies. Our approach is the opposite to 
that used, for example, by Croushore (2010), who based his analysis solely on the lat-
est available time series of actual data, which naturally contain ex post revisions. 
If we look at the actual time series of effective GDP growth, which is prob-
ably the most affected by data revisions, we find that the difference between our 
method and the actual time series downloaded at the end of 2010 is, on average, zero. 
Nevertheless, there are differences in individual years. The largest negative deviation 
(-0.6 percentage points) was observed in 2006 and the  largest positive deviation 
(0.5 percentage points) in 2004. The standard deviation over the whole sample is 0.3 
percentage points. 
The following standard measures are considered for the descriptive analysis of 
forecasting accuracy: mean forecast error (MFE), mean absolute forecast error (MAFE), 
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), which, in addition to MAFE, represents 
the forecast errors as a percentage of the actual values, mean squared error (MSE), 
and root mean squared error (RMSE). 
A forecast is considered to be biased if it is systematically too high or too low. 
As in, e.g., Ager et al. (2009) and Croushore (2010), we verify the forecast bias by 
regressing the forecast errors on a constant: 
                                                      tt e α ε = +                                                               (3) 
The coefficient α represents the MFE, so that equation (3) is effectively a test 
for a zero mean of the forecasting error. The null hypothesis, that the forecasts are 
unbiased, would hold if α = 0. Later in the paper we also use two modifications of 
equation 3 for the absolute  t e  and squared 
2
t e  forecasting errors. 
In addition, we perform a forecast comparison regression, following Ang et al. 
(2007) and Stock and Watson (1999): 
                                               (1 ) 
cf alt
tt tt af f u λλ = +− +                                           (4) 
where 
cf
t f  is the Consensus forecast, 
alt
t f  represents the alternative forecast, i.e., the in-
ternational institutions’ forecasts and the naive forecast, λ is the corresponding co-
efficient, and  t u  is the forecast error associated with a combined forecast. If λ = 0, 
then the  Consensus forecast adds nothing to the  alternative forecast, and we thus 
conclude that the  alternative forecast outperforms the  Consensus benchmark. If   
λ = 1, then, conversely, the alternative forecast adds nothing to the Consensus fore-
cast. It is possible that if λ is significantly negative then it does contain information 
but of a  perverse kind. In this specific example, when the  Consensus forecast is 
raised (lowered), the optimal combined forecast should be reduced (increased). 
Finally, the Diebold-Mariano (D-M) test of statistical significance in the fore-
casting errors of competing forecasts is used (Diebold and Mariano, 1995). The D-M 
test assesses the quality of each forecast using a loss function of the forecast error. It 
is common to use the MSE loss differential to evaluate business cycle forecasts: 354                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4 
Figure 1  Effective Euro-Area GDP and CPI forecasts – visual comparison 
                  A. 2009 GDP                                              B. 2009 CPI 
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Notes: Month 24 on the x axis represents the first available Consensus forecast for 2009. The forecast was 
published in the January 2008 Consensus issue. The first corresponding IMF, EC and OECD forecasts 
were released in April and May 2008, respectively (see the points at 21 and 20 months). Finally, 
the straight line represents the ex-post known actual values. 
Dashed lines depict the interval containing 68 percent of the individual forecasters pooled by Con-
sensus (one standard error around the mean Consensus forecast). 
                                               0
cf alt dM S E M S E = −=                                               (5) 
where 
cf MSE  and 
alt MSE  are the mean squared errors of the Consensus and alter-
native forecasts, respectively. The null hypothesis (H0) that two forecasts are on aver-
age the same is tested. 
The D-M test statistic is expressed in the following form: 
                                              ()
12
20 d ˆ DM d g T π = ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦                                              (6) 
where  d  is the average difference between the errors of two forecasts at time 
123 t, , , . . . T =  and  ( ) 0 d ˆ g  is a consistent estimation of a distribution function () 0 d g . 
3. Empirical Results for Effective GDP Growth and CPI and PPI Inflation 
3.1 Visual Forecast Assessment 
Firstly, we provide a visual forecast assessment of the last year of our sample. 
We find the initial visual inspection helpful before we proceed to the empirical results. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the effective euro-area GDP growth and CPI 
inflation forecasts for 2009, when the financial crisis peaked. The forecasts for 2009 
are characterized by the largest downward re-estimations, which are obvious given 
the impact of the crisis. In the case of the GDP growth forecast (see Figure 1A), 
the difference between the first published Consensus forecast (1.9 percent) and the last 
published Consensus forecast (-4.3 percent) reached 6.2 percentage points. The in-
ternational institutions were slightly more pessimistic than Consensus. 
The re-estimations were much smaller in the case of the CPI inflation forecast 
for 2009 (1.4 percentage points; see Figure 1B). The CPI inflation forecast was lifted 
initially due to increasing oil prices until July 2008, but afterwards it was lowered 
sharply as in the case of the GDP growth forecast (due to the consequences of the fi-
nancial crisis). 
The intervals of individual Consensus forecasters are illustrated by the dashed 
lines. It is apparent that a gradual shortening of the horizon implies a narrowing of 
 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                         355 
Figure 2  Gradual Improvement of Consensus Forecasts  
(effective euro-area GDP growth and CPI inflation, 1994–2009) 
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Figure 3  Gradual Improvement of Consensus Forecasts  
(effective euro-area GDP growth, CPI, and PPI inflation, 2004–2009) 
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the intervals. In other words, the individual Consensus forecasts draw nearer to each 
other over time, which we interpret as meaning decreasing uncertainty of the mean 
Consensus forecast. 
Nevertheless, exceptions occur in turbulent times, when the  uncertainty of 
the mean  Consensus  forecast might increase despite a  shortening of the  forecast 
horizon (for a detailed analysis see also Dovern et al., 2009). 
In the case of both the GDP growth forecast and the CPI inflation forecast, 
the intervals around the mean Consensus forecast (the dashed lines) widened marked-
ly after October 2008 (15 months before the end of the forecast horizon). This was 
associated with the increased uncertainty of the mean Consensus forecast at that time 
(increased disagreement among forecasters). A follow-up narrowing of the interval 
occurred in January 2009 in the case of CPI inflation (12 months before the end of 
the forecast horizon) and in June 2009 in the case of GDP growth (7 months before 
the end of the forecast horizon). 
Subsequently, Figures 2 and 3 show a gradual improvement in the Consensus 
accuracy along the forecast horizon. The mean average percentage error (MAPE) 
serves as a measure of the forecasting accuracy, allowing us to compare the forecasts 
of different economic variables. Intuitively, the forecasting errors decrease as we move 
toward the end of the predicted year. Forecasters have more information to make 
more accurate assumptions about the future and the forecasting process thus becomes 
easier. Similarly, Osterloh (2008) shows that the average RMSE of the Consensus 
forecasts for German GDP growth (across all forecasters and target years) diminishes 
strongly as we get closer to the end of the predicted year. 
It is also apparent that Consensus is characterized by higher forecasting errors 
in the case of GDP growth than in the case of CPI inflation. The accuracy of the CPI 
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Table 1  Comparison of Forecasts: MFE 
1994–2009 2002–2009 
Effective CPI  Effective GDP  Effective CPI  Effective GDP  MFE 
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 
CF (April, October)  0.02  -0.12 -0.07  -0.89*** 0.08 0.06  -0.10  -1.11* 
IMF 0.04  0.06 -0.02  -1.03*** 0.09 0.21 0.02  -1.17** 
CF (May, November) 0.01 -0.10 -0.07 -0.85*** 0.07  0.07  -0.10  -1.04* 
EC  - - -  -  0.00 0.03  -0.06 -1.09** 
OECD -  -  -0.03  -0.88*** 0.07 0.22 0.00  -1.07** 
NF  -0.22 -0.26 -0.19  -0.32  -0.25 -0.16 -0.67 -0.93 
Notes: - t is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
- MFE (mean forecast error) indicates whether a forecast is systematically biased. A positive value 
indicates that forecasts are, on average, underestimated. 
- Equation (3) is estimated by OLS. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the MFE is equal to zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
inflation forecast is very similar in both periods (compare Figures 2 and 3). In con-
trast, the accuracy of the GDP growth forecast deteriorates substantially in the shorter 
period from 2004 to 2009. This is caused by the outlying year 2009 and confirms 
the stylized fact that some years are harder to predict than others. 
3.2 Empirical Results 
We tested for forecast bias in the Consensus forecasts, the international institu-
tions’ forecasts, and the naive forecasts (NF). Table 1 shows the results for the mean 
forecast error (MFE). The closer the value to zero, the less biased the forecast. Values  
in bold indicate the lowest forecasting error of the variables shown (CPI inflation and 
GDP growth) at the given forecast horizon (the current year and the next year). 
Because the international institutions’ forecasts are released twice a year only, 
the IMF forecasts are compared with the corresponding April and October Consensus 
issues, and the EC, OECD, and naive forecasts are compared with the May and 
November Consensus issues (see also Section 2 for clarification). 
The forecasts for GDP growth are biased upward (overestimated). This bias is 
statistically significant for the  next-year forecasts with the  exception of the  naive 
forecasts, which are characterized by the lowest mean forecasting errors. This is in 
accordance with the results found in the literature (Ager et al., 2009; Batchelor, 2001; 
Osterloh, 2008) and reflects the systematically positive expectations of forecasters 
about the future. Most Consensus forecasters are affiliated with investment banks and 
may intend to promote positive expectations among their clients (self-fulfilling ex-
pectations). 
On the contrary, the CPI inflation forecasts are mostly underestimated by all 
institutions, including Consensus, but not at statistically significant levels, i.e., they 
are not biased. This holds especially for the shorter period from 2002 to 2009. This 
may possibly reflect a positive role of independent central banks and the resulting 
anchoring of inflation at low levels (Dovern et al., 2009). 
It is evident from Table 2 that all the compared forecasts are biased at the 1% 
significance level if we take into account the absolute forecasting error (MAFE). 
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Table 2  Comparison of Forecasts: MAFE 
1994–2009 2002–2009 
Effective CPI  Effective GDP  Effective CPI  Effective GDP  MAFE 
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 
CF (April, October)  0.18*** 0.61*** 0.4*** 1.29*** 0.18*** 0.54*** 0.34***  1.69*** 
IMF 0.2***  0.61*** 0.42*** 1.36*** 0.21*** 0.55*** 0.38***  1.69*** 
CF (May, November) 0.14*** 0.58*** 0.34*** 1.22*** 0.15*** 0.51*** 0.29***  1.6*** 
EC  - - -  - 0.17*** 0.5*** 0.29***  1.64*** 
OECD -  -  0.36*** 1.19*** 0.2*** 0.62*** 0.34***  1.47*** 
NF 0.66*** 0.92*** 1.42*** 1.67*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 1.47***  2.09*** 
Notes: - t is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
- MAFE (mean absolute forecast error) indicates the average size of the forecast errors (deviations) in 
the examined period irrespective of the direction (positive or negative) of the error. 
- Equation (3) is estimated by OLS. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the MAFE is equal to zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table  3 Comparison of Forecasts: RMSE 
1994–2009 2002–2009 
Effective CPI  Effective GDP  Effective CPI  Effective GDP  RMSE 
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 
CF (April, October)  0.24*** 0.76*** 0.58** 1.84**  0.23** 0.75**  0.44***  2.32** 
MF 0.27*** 0.74*** 0.59*** 1.84*** 0.25** 0.7***  0.48**  2.22** 
CF (May, November) 0.2*** 0.72*** 0.53** 1.75**  0.21** 0.7**  0.4** 2.2* 
EC  - - -  -  0.22** 0.7** 0.39**  2.24* 
OECD -  -  0.50*** 1.66**  0.26** 0.77** 0.44**  2.05* 
NF 0.86*** 1.08*** 2.03*** 2.34**  0.95*  0.87*** 2.19*  2.84* 
Notes: - t is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
- RMSE (root mean squared error) penalizes larger forecast errors more. 
- Equation (3) is estimated by OLS. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the MSE is equal to zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Nevertheless, regarding solely the size of the forecasting errors, the Consensus fore-
casts are superior to the other forecasts in most cases. Finally, the naive forecasts 
(NF) are characterized by having the largest forecasting errors, in accordance with 
our intuition. 
In Table 3 we report RMSE statistics, which are expressed in annual per-
centage terms. The RMSE ranges from around 0.2 percentage points in the case of 
the Consensus CPI inflation forecast to 2.8 percentage points in the case of the naive 
GDP growth forecast. As with the MAFE, all the forecasts are biased at statistically 
significant levels, but, again, the Consensus forecasting errors are relatively lower in 
many cases and, conversely, the naive forecasts are the worst. 
The Consensus forecasts beat the international institutions’ forecasts mainly in 
the current-year forecasts and, additionally, Consensus is superior to the naive fore-
casts in all cases. Furthermore, if we test for the null hypothesis as to whether the dif-
ferences between the forecast accuracy of two competitive forecasts are on average 
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Table 4  Relative RMSE and D-M Test of Statistical Significance in Forecast Differences 
1994–2009 2002–2009 
Effective CPI  Effective GDP  Effective CPI  Effective GDP  CF vs. 
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 
EC  -  -  -  -  0.95 1.0  1.03 0.98
*** 
IMF  0.89 1.03 0.98 1.0  0.92 1.07 0.92 1.05 










Notes :- t is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
- A relative RMSE value lower than 1 indicates that Consensus performs better than the alternatives 
(EC, IMF, OECD, and NF), whereas a value higher than 1 indicates that the alternatives are better. 
Stars indicate if the null hypothesis of the same forecasting accuracy of the compared forecasts can 
be rejected at these levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
- The IMF forecasts are compared with the April and October Consensus issues. The EC, OECD and 
NF are compared with the May and November Consensus issues. 
 
the same, taking into account the number of observations and the volatility of vari-
ables (the D-M test; see Section 2), we see that the effective CPI inflation Consensus 
forecasts beat the naive forecasts at the 1% significance level for both the current 
year and the next year (1994–2009). In the case of the GDP growth forecasts, Con-
sensus beats the naive forecast at the 5% significance level, but for the current-year 
forecast only. This finding is in accordance with the previous literature (Osterloh, 
2008), which concludes that the accuracy of the Consensus next-year GDP growth 
forecasts is relatively low. 
We are not able to make any strong conclusion about the differences between 
the Consensus forecasts on the one hand and the IMF and OECD forecasts on 
the  other since they are not statistically significant. Assuming only the  range of 
the RMSE forecasting errors, Consensus is more precise than the IMF forecasts for 
the current year but is less accurate than the OECD forecasts for GDP growth. 
Finally, all the forecasts are covered in the shorter sample (2002–2009). Con-
sensus beats the  naive forecast at the  1% significance level only in the  case of 
the CPI inflation forecast for the next year. Nevertheless, Consensus is also superior 
(at the 1% significance level) to the EC forecast for GDP growth in the next year. In 
all remaining cases, even though the values of mostly lower than 1 in Table 4 point to 
Consensus having lower forecasting errors, this finding is not statistically significant. 
If we focus solely on the pre-crisis period from 1994 to 2007 (see the Ap-
pendix, Table 4), the results are more diverse. Most importantly, Consensus not only 
beats, at a statistically significant level, the EC GDP growth forecasts, but also beats 
the IMF GDP growth forecast for both the current and the next year. Conversely, 
the Consensus forecast for GDP growth for the next year is outperformed (at the 10% 
significance level) by the OECD forecast. 
Additionally, we show the results of the information content test (Table 5). 
We are, de facto, carrying out a forecast comparison regression (see Equation 4, Sec-
tion 2). If the presented coefficient is 1 or higher, then Consensus outperforms the al-
ternative forecast (EC, IMF, OECD, and NF), which, in this particular case, adds 
nothing to a combined forecast. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                         359 
Table 5  Test of the Information Content of Consensus Forecasts 
1994–2009 2002–2009 
Effective CPI  Effective GDP  Effective CPI  Effective GDP  CF vs. 
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 
0.75 0.67 0.47 6.8 
EC -  -  -  - 
(0.52) (1.24) (0.7)  (4.24) 
0.95
** 1.01
***  0.58 -0.2  0.77 -0.03  0.82
*  -2.9 
IMF 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.42) (2.08) (0.46) (0.7)  (0.4)  (2.09) 
0.37 -2.05
*  0.95
**  0.79 0.67
**  -3.93
** 
OECD -  - 











(0.04) (0.16) (0.05) (0.22) (0.06) (0.46) (0.05) (0.43) 
Notes:- t is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
- Equation (4) is estimated by OLS. If the presented coefficient is 1 or higher, then the alternative 
forecasts (EC, IMF, OECD, NF) add nothing to a combined forecast of Consensus and one of the al-
ternative forecasts. The lower the coefficient, the less the amount of information contained in the Con-
sensus forecasts. Standard errors are given in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. Stars 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at these levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
- The IMF forecasts are compared with the April and October Consensus issues. The EC, OECD and 
NF are compared with the May and November Consensus issues. 
 
The test reveals that Consensus outperforms the  naive forecasts at the  1% 
significance level in all cases. In the entire sample period (1994–2009), Consensus is 
also superior (at statistically significant levels) to the IMF forecasts for CPI inflation 
in both the current and the next year. Nevertheless, it is less useful than the OECD 
forecast for GDP growth in the next year at the 10% significance level. 
In the shorter period (2002–2009), Consensus adds more information to a com-
bined forecast with the IMF for GDP growth in the current year at the 10% signifi-
cance level and in a combined forecast with the OECD for CPI inflation and GDP 
growth in the current year at the 5% significance level. Conversely, Consensus adds 
no information, or adds information of a perverse kind, to a combined forecast with 
the OECD for GDP growth in the next year at the 5% significance level. 
Because the international institutions (EC, IMF, and OECD) do not provide 
forecasts for PPI inflation, this is assessed only against the naive forecast. Figures 4 
and 5 show the forecast accuracy (measured by the mean percentage forecast error) 
of the April and October Consensus issues in the period from 2004 to 2009.
2 The pre-
sented variables include effective euro-area CPI and PPI inflation and GDP growth. 
The Consensus April and October forecasts for the current year are charac-
terized by lower forecasting errors (MAPE) in comparison with the naive forecasts 
(see Figure 4). The Consensus effective euro-area PPI inflation forecast for the cur-
rent year is superior to the naive forecast at the 10% significance level (measured by 
the D-M test statistic). The forecasting errors of the next-year forecasts (Figure 5) 
match the  naive forecasts except for GDP growth, where Consensus has a  lower 
forecasting error. 
2 The short sample period is due to the limited availability of previous PPI forecasts. 360                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4 
Figure  4 MAPE of Current-Year Forecasts (t)  Figure  5 MAPE of Next-Year Forecasts (t+1) 
Consensus versus NF (2004–2009)                       Consensus versus NF (2004–2009) 
        




















If we compare the magnitude of the forecasting errors between different vari-
ables, we find that the Consensus forecasts for GDP growth and PPI inflation for 
the  current year are more than four times higher compared to the  CPI inflation 
forecast. The next-year forecasting errors of GDP growth and PPI inflation are more 
than six and three times higher, respectively, than the CPI inflation forecasts. This 
reflects the different historical variability of the two classes of economic variables. 
If we observe the pre-crisis period only (see the Appendix, Figures 1 and 2), 
the differences in forecasting accuracy among individual variables are not as large. 
Furthermore, regarding only the size of the forecasting errors, the forecast for PPI 
inflation for the next year outperforms the naive forecast. 
3.3 Combined Forecast Accuracy 
In this section we implement the method proposed by Eisenbeis, Waggoner, 
and Zha (2002). This method compares forecasts which contain multiple variables. In 
our case, we have complete forecasts for two variables: effective euro-area CPI infla-
tion and effective euro-area GDP growth. The method is based on the fact that some 
variables are hard to forecast due to their high historical volatility (e.g., GDP growth), 
whereas other variables, like CPI inflation, which has been well anchored in recent 
decades, are more easily predicted. When comparing different forecasts which con-
tain outlooks for multiple variables, it may be useful to capture their historical vola-
tility before carrying out a joint forecast assessment of them (see Table 6). 
In our case, the volatility (dispersion) of the actual values of effective euro- 
-area GDP growth in the period from 1994 to 2009 was more than six times higher
3 
than the volatility of effective euro-area CPI inflation. Obviously, due to its lower 
volatility, the forecasts of effective CPI inflation are expected to have lower fore-
casting errors. This is why we attach a six-times higher weighting to the forecasting 
errors of CPI inflation forecasts than to the GDP growth forecast. In fact, we penalize 
the CPI inflation forecast. After the weighting procedure we obtain a single indicator 
of both CPI and GDP forecasts. 
Similarly to the analysis of sole variables, neither forecast significantly out-
performs Consensus. Conversely, Consensus outperforms the EC forecast for the cur-
rent year at the 5% significance level. Moreover, Consensus beats the naive forecast 
at the 1% significance level in two cases (see Table 7). 
3 The high difference in volatility observed between the two variables is caused by the outlying year 2009. 
Until 2008, the historical volatility of GDP growth was only two times higher than the volatility of CPI 
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Table 6  Comparison of Forecasts: Weighted Indicator (CPI, GDP) 
1994–2009 2002–2009 
RMSE 
t t+1  t  t+1 















EC -  -  0.22
*** 0.82
* 








Notes: - t is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
- Weighted Indicator = w1.CPI + w2.GDP. Weights w1 and w2 reflect historical volatility (statistical disper-
sion) in the period from 1994 to 2009 (w1 = 0.87, w2 = 0.13). 
- Equation (3) is estimated by OLS. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the MSE is equal to zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 7  Relative RMSE and D-M Test of Statistical Significance in Forecast 
Differences: Weighted Indicator (CPI, GDP) 
1994–2009 2002–2009 
CF vs. 
t t+1 t t+1 
EC -  -  0.91
**  0.98 
IMF  0.92 1.08 0.96 1.15 
OECD -  -  0.83  1.0 
NF 0.23
**  0.72 0.19 0.76
*** 
Notes:- t is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
- A value of relative RMSE lower than 1 indicates that Consensus performs better than the alternatives 
(EC, IMF, OECD, and NF), whereas a value higher than 1 indicates that the alternatives are better. 
Stars indicate if the null hypothesis of the same forecast accuracy of the compared forecasts can be 
rejected at these levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
- The IMF forecasts are compared with the April and October Consensus issues. The EC, OECD and 
NF are compared with the May and November Consensus issues. 
If we exclude the crisis years of 2008 and 2009, the difference between the Con-
sensus and international institutions’ forecasts is less obvious (see the  Appendix, 
Table 7). None of the alternative forecasts is significantly better or worse than Con-
sensus. Nevertheless, Consensus is superior to the naive forecast at the 1% signifi-
cance level in all four cases. 
Additionally, if we test for the information content of the alternative forecasts 
(Table 8), we find that Consensus is more informative than the naive forecasts at 
the 1% significance level. Consensus adds more to a combined forecast in the case of 
the IMF (1994–2009), EC, and OECD (2002–2009) current-year forecasts as well. 
Excluding the crisis years changes the overall picture only marginally. 
Another important characteristic of a multiple-economic-variable forecast is 
the expected consistency among single economic variables given by their long-term 
relationship. We measure the mutual consistency between the CPI inflation forecast 
and the GDP growth forecast by their mutual correlation. The correlation coefficient 
between the actual values of CPI inflation and GDP growth in the period from 1994 
to 2009 was positive (correlation coefficient equal to 0.51). Nevertheless, the correla- 
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t t+1 t t+1 
1.05
*  1.23 
EC -  - 
(0.55) (1.58) 
0.83
**  -0.38 0.67  -1.26 
IMF 
(0.35) (0.6)  (0.45) (0.79) 
0.95
**  0.47 








(0.04) (0.26) (0.05) (0.47) 
Notes: - t is the forecast is the forecast for the current year and t+1 is the forecast for the next year. 
Equation (4) is estimated by OLS. If the presented coefficient is 1 or higher, then the alternative 
forecasts (EC, IMF, OECD, NF) add nothing to a combined forecast of Consensus and one of the al-
ternative forecasts. The lower the coefficient, the less the amount of information contained in the Con-
sensus forecasts. Standard errors are given in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. Stars 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at these levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
- The IMF forecasts are compared with the April and October Consensus issues. The EC, OECD and 
NF are compared with the May and November Consensus issues. 
tion coefficient was strongly affected by the last observation. If we exclude 2009, no 
correlation between these two variables is apparent. 
Accordingly, the Consensus and international institutions’ forecasts for the cur-
rent year are correlated at similar or higher levels to the historical values. They are 
therefore strongly affected by the actual values. Conversely, the forecasts for the next 
year are less correlated. Thus, we do not detect strong consistency in the longer-term 
forecasts. 
Furthermore, if we look at the  direction of the  forecast re-estimations we 
cannot find strong synchronization between the forecast updates of CPI inflation and 
GDP growth. The forecasts for these two variables are very often re-estimated in dif-
ferent directions. Only about 54 percent of all the Consensus re-estimations are syn-
chronized, i.e., the forecasts for CPI inflation and GDP growth are re-estimated in 
the same direction. The degree of synchronization in the case of the EC, IMF, and 
OECD forecasts varied between 39 and 56 percent, depending on the  number of 
observations. 
4. USD/EUR Forecast Accuracy 
Figure 6 shows the  evolution of the  nominal USD/EUR exchange rate and 
the corresponding Consensus forecasts.
4 The Consensus point forecasts at the three- 
-month, one-year, and two-year horizons are interpolated. We start with the January 
1999 Consensus forecast, which extends from April 1999 to January 2001. All sub-
sequent Consensus forecasts are constructed in the same way.  
At the beginning of the observed period, when the US dollar was appreciating, 
the Consensus forecasts were systematically higher, i.e., a weaker dollar was sys- 
 
4 Only the January, April, July, and October Consensus forecasts (out of a total of twelve monthly fore-
casts) are presented to avoid overloading the chart. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                         363 
Figure 6  USD/EUR and Its Consensus Forecasts (1999–2009) 




















Source: Thomson’s Datastream and Consensus Economics 
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a 3M (3 months) ahead forecasts are assessed until the December 2009 forecast, 1Y (1 year) ahead 
forecasts are assessed until the March 2009 forecast and 2Y (2 years) ahead forecasts are 
assessed until the March 2008 forecast. 
- CF: Consensus forecast, FWD: forecast derived from forward exchange rates on the survey day of 
the Consensus forecast, NF: naive forecast. 
- Equation (3) is estimated by OLS. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the MSE is equal to zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
tematically predicted. As from 2002, when the trend reversed, the dollar was depre-
ciating faster than Consensus assumed. When the dollar moved above its average 
value for the whole period (USD/EUR 1.18), Consensus started to forecast stability 
or appreciation of the dollar. Finally, after the dollar reached historical lows (in sum-
mer 2008) Consensus started to systematically predict its appreciation. 
Restricted to our sample period from 1999 to 2009, the Consensus forecasts 
tended systematically toward the  average USD/EUR value. Accordingly, the  dis-
parity between the one-year and two-years-ahead forecasts was negligible. They both 
reached USD/EUR 1.2 on average. 
From Table 9 (MFE), it is apparent that all forecasts were unbiased only in 
the case of the three-months-ahead forecasts in the long sample from 1999 to 2009. 
In addition, the one-year-ahead Consensus forecast was unbiased as well. The  re-
maining forecasts were biased downward, i.e., a stronger dollar was systematically 
predicted. 364                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4 






3M 1Y 2Y 3M 1Y 2Y 
FWD 1.08
**  1.01 0.94 1.03 0.87
**  0.89 





a 3M (3 months) ahead forecasts are assessed until the December 2009 forecast, 1Y (1 year) ahead 
forecasts are assessed until the March 2009 forecast and 2Y (2 years) ahead forecasts are assessed 
until the March 2008 forecast. 
- CF: Consensus forecast, FWD: forecast derived from forward exchange rates on the survey day of 
the Consensus forecast, NF: naive forecast. 
- A value of relative RMSE lower than 1 indicates that Consensus performs better than the alternatives 
(EC, IMF, OECD, and NF), whereas a value higher than 1 indicates that the alternatives are better. 
Stars indicate if the null hypothesis of the same forecast accuracy of the compared forecasts can be 
rejected at these levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
 





3M 1Y 2Y 3M 1Y 2Y 
-0.22 0.44
*  0.94












(0.28) (0.19) (0.2)  (0.43) (0.27) (0.31) 
Notes: Equation (4) is estimated by OLS. If the presented coefficient is 1 or higher, then the alternative fore-
casts (FWD and NF) add nothing to a combined forecast of Consensus and one of the alternative 
forecasts. The lower the coefficient, the less the amount of information contained in the Consensus 
forecasts. Standard errors are given in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. Stars indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at these levels of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
 
The Consensus forecasting accuracy was compared with the naive forecast 
and the forecast derived from the forward exchange rate (FWD). Both forecasts were 
even more biased, except for the FWD forecast at the two-year horizon in the short 
sample period (2002–2009). 
Looking at Table 10, the  Consensus three-months-ahead forecast is outper-
formed by the FWD forecast at the 5% significance level in the whole sample (1999– 
–2009). Nevertheless, in the short sample period from 2002 to 2009, the Consensus 
forecast improved relative to both the FWD and the naive forecast. Consensus was, 
in particular, superior to the naive forecast at all three forecast horizons and, in ad-
dition, against the FWD forecast at the one-year horizon. 
If we exclude the crisis years (see the Appendix, Table 7), the results are 
the same in the long sample period from 1999 to 2007. Nevertheless, the results for 
the short sample period from 2002 to 2007 confirm the statistically significant 
superiority of the Consensus forecast (in accordance with Table 10). 
Furthermore, the  results of the  information content test (Table 11) support 
the superiority of Consensus. In the short sample period Consensus is superior to 
the alternative forecasts at the 1% significance level at all forecast horizons except 
for the  FWD three-months-ahead forecast. In the  long sample period, Consensus Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 4                                         365 
outperforms the alternative forecasts in the two-years-ahead forecast at the 1% sig-
nificance level. 
5. Conclusion 
We compared the accuracy of the Consensus Economics forecasts to those of 
the European Commission, International Monetary Fund, and Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, and also to the naive forecast and the forecast 
implied by forward exchange rates. Basic descriptive statistics of forecast efficiency 
and forecast bias as well as tests for statistical significance in the differences between 
competing forecasts were applied. We analyzed the forecasts for GDP growth, CPI 
inflation, PPI inflation, and USD/EUR. 
Forecasting accuracy was compared before and during the  recent financial 
crisis. With respect to the GDP growth and CPI inflation forecasts, we found that 
the  Consensus Economics forecasts usually outperformed the others  significantly, 
especially during the  whole period from 1994 to 2009. The  results were not that 
strong for the  pre-crisis period. The  Consensus forecasts beat the  international 
institutions’ forecasts mainly in the current-year forecasts. In the next-year forecasts, 
the IMF and OECD forecasts perform similarly to those of Consensus. Additionally, 
Consensus is superior to the naive forecasts at all forecast horizons. 
In accordance with previous literature, we confirm a relatively low level of ac-
curacy of the next-year GDP growth forecasts, which are biased upward by all insti-
tutions, whereas the CPI inflation forecasts are unbiased. 
The PPI inflation and USD/EUR forecasts were compared only with the naive 
forecast and the forward rate forecast in the case of USD/EUR due to the absence  
of comparable forecasts by international institutions. The Consensus PPI inflation 
forecast significantly beats the  naive forecast for the  current year. The  Consensus 
forecast for USD/EUR improved dramatically after 2002, when it significantly out-
performed the naive forecast at all forecasting horizons and the forward implied 
forecast at the one-year horizon. A stronger dollar was systematically predicted over 
the observed period by all the assessed forecasts. 
The practical advantage of the Consensus Economics forecasts lies in a broader 
range of predicted economic variables and in the high frequency of forecast releases 
(every month). Based on the relatively high forecasting accuracy and the additional 
practical characteristics of Consensus, the Czech National Bank will continue to use 
it in its prediction process. However, the Consensus Forecasts will also be regularly 
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